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Human cooperation in groups: 
variation begets variation
Pieter van den Berg1, Lucas Molleman1,2, Jaakko Junikka3,4, Mikael Puurtinen3,4 & 
Franz J. Weissing1
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tendency to cooperate with others. It has also been shown that individuals condition their behaviour 
on the overall cooperation level of their peers. Yet, little is known about how individuals respond 
to heterogeneity in cooperativeness in their neighbourhood. Here, we present an experimental 
study investigating whether and how people respond to heterogeneous behaviour in a public goods 
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the contributions of their peers are more heterogeneous, but a substantial fraction of individuals 
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implications for the outcome of cooperative interactions.
Scientists of various disciplines have since long been interested in cooperation1–4. For biologists, it is 
a major challenge to explain why natural selection sometimes favours behaviour that beneits other 
individuals (cooperation), especially when it is costly to perform5–8. he biological world is rife with 
examples of such behaviour (from birds and social insects to bacteria), and humans are no exception. In 
fact, human cooperation is in many ways more extreme than cooperation in most other animal species: 
we cooperate with non-related strangers and on enormous scales9–11. Not surprisingly, scholars from the 
social sciences also have a long tradition in studying cooperation12–16.
Studies using a range of methods have consistently shown that there is considerable individual vari-
ation in human cooperative behaviour. his is true for the general propensity to cooperate (cooperation 
tendency)14–17, but also for the ways people condition their cooperation on the cooperation of others 
(cooperation strategy)18–21. Importantly, the presence of those individual diferences can signiicantly 
impact the outcomes of cooperative interactions in groups19,22. Recent theoretical studies have shown that 
the presence of even small amounts of variation in cooperative behaviour can be decisive for the evo-
lution of cooperation23–26. Interestingly, also environmental variation in cooperation has been found to 
favour cooperative and forgiving strategies27–30. he success of cooperative and forgiving strategies in the 
presence of environmental variation stems from their ability to uphold proitable interactions even when 
partners mistakenly fail to cooperate, or when a cooperative act is mistakenly perceived as defection.
Given the prevalence of individual diferences in cooperative behaviour, and the importance of varia-
tion for determining outcomes of cooperative interactions, it is surprising that little is known about how 
people condition their own cooperation on variation in cooperative behaviour in their social group. In 
studies designed to assess individuals’ cooperation strategies, response to heterogeneity is oten disre-
garded. Many of these studies are based on the public goods game (PGG), where individuals are grouped 
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and endowed with a sum of money, and then have to decide how much of the money to contribute to an 
account that beneits all members of their group. In this set-up, the total earnings of the group increase 
with increasing group member contributions, but individuals maximize their earnings by contributing 
nothing. To get an idea of the cooperation strategies employed by diferent individuals, subjects are asked 
how much they would contribute given various hypothetical average contribution levels of their fellow 
group members18,31. Such studies generally ind that a large proportion of individuals is willing to con-
tribute about equally much (or slightly less) as the average contribution of their fellow group members 
(they are oten classiied as ‘conditional cooperators’); others contribute nothing, regardless of the average 
peer contribution (‘free-riders’); still others contribute most when the average cooperation level of their 
interaction partners is intermediate.
One might expect that people take this variation in cooperation strategies into account when making 
decisions on their own degree of cooperation. In fact, some studies32–34 have reported that, on average, 
individuals tend to reduce their contribution to a public good if the contributions of their peers are more 
heterogeneous. However, it is not clear how this efect arises. Does the response to heterogeneity relect 
a speciic conditional strategy or a more general cautiousness in a variable environment? Do all individ-
uals respond to heterogeneity in the same way, or are there consistent diferences between individuals? 
If there are diferences, how are they related to general cooperation tendency?
To answer these questions, we conducted an experiment that consisted of two parts. In the irst part, 
subjects played ten rounds of a PGG in groups of four, where group composition changed in every round. 
In each round, subjects decided how to distribute an endowment of 20 points between their personal 
account and an account that beneitted all group members (see Methods for details). We interpret the 
average contribution of a subject to the group project in these ten rounds as a measure of the subject’s 
general ‘cooperation tendency’. In the second part, the same individuals decided how much they would 
contribute in a PGG, for ten hypothetical scenarios concerning the contributions of their fellow group 
members. In these scenarios, the hypothetical group member contributions were always either 0, 10 or 20 
points, yielding a total of ten possible combinations of peer contributions. Six of these ten combinations 
were pairs of cases within which the average peer contribution was the same, but their heterogeneity was 
diferent. Comparing subjects’ conditional contributions between these scenarios allowed us to investi-
gate how subjects respond to heterogeneity in peer contributions.
Results
Figure  1 shows a detailed breakdown of the conditional contributions made in the second part of the 
experiment, for each combination of peer contributions. Overall, response contributions increased with 
peer contributions. If all fellow group members contributed nothing (letmost bar), 95% of individuals 
also contributed nothing in response. Conversely, if all fellow group members contributed the maximum 
(rightmost bar), 72% of subjects also contributed the maximum in response. he grouped bars show 
pairs of scenarios where the average contribution of fellow group members is the same, but the hetero-
geneity in contributions difers. For example, the two middle bars (the 5th and 6th bar) show two cases 
where the average contribution is 10, but where the contributions are either heterogeneous (0, 10 and 20; 
Figure 1. Contributions to the group project in response to various combinations of peer contributions. 
Each bar shows a breakdown of how subjects responded to a speciic combination of contributions of the 
three other group members (indicated by the three coloured blocks under each bar). Bars are grouped 
together for cases that have the same average contribution of fellow group members, but where heterogeneity 
in peer contributions difers. Completely unresponsive individuals (contributing the same regardless of peer 
contributions) were omitted from the analysis (see Methods).
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bar 5) or homogeneous (three times 10; bar 6). From now on, we will focus on these pairs of scenarios. 
For all three pairs, Table 1 systematically compares the low- and the high-heterogeneity case concerning 
the average contribution of the subjects, the standard deviation of these contributions, and the frequency 
of extreme contributions (both minimum and maximum).
On average, individuals tended to contribute less when there was more heterogeneity in peer contri-
butions (linear mixed model with subject as random factor, P <  0.001; see Supplementary Information, 
section 3 for a detailed overview of statistical methods). his is in accordance with earlier studies32–34. In 
addition, we observe that in two of the three comparisons the variation in response contributions was 
higher in case of more heterogeneity in peer contributions (for averages 10 and 13.33, Brown-Forsythe 
test: P < 0.001; for average 6.67, Brown-Forsythe test: P = 0.733). Finally, subjects were more likely to 
make extreme contributions when there was more heterogeneity in peer contributions – this was the case 
for both contributing the minimal amount 0 (logistic generalized mixed model with subject as a random 
factor, P = 0.001) and the maximal amount 20 (P < 0.001). Generally speaking, more heterogeneity in 
peer contributions caused subjects to make more extreme contributions themselves.
Figure 2 reveals that individuals responded to heterogeneity in peer contributions in diferent ways. 
We classiied subjects by comparing their contributions within each of the three pairs of scenarios that 
had the same average peer contribution, but diferent heterogeneity in peer contributions. If they con-
tributed more in the cases with more heterogeneity, they were classiied as ‘positive’ responders to het-
erogeneity, and if they contributed less, they were classiied as ‘negative’ responders. If they contributed 
equally within all three comparisons, they were classiied as ‘neutral’, and if they contributed more in case 
of high heterogeneity in some of the three comparisons, and less in others, they were classiied as ‘incon-
sistent’. In line with the inding that, on average, contributions were lower in case of more heterogeneity 
Peer contributions Response contributions
Mean Heterogeneity Mean s.d. % min % max
6.67
low 4.32 4.61 41.7 0.5
high 3.74 5.07 53.2 1.8
10.00
low 7.65 4.58 14.7 1.8
high 6.90 6.20 30.3 6.9
13.33
low 9.42 6.32 14.2 13.3
high 8.30 7.66 31.6 20.6
Table 1.  Contribution to the group project in response to peer contributions difering in their mean 
and heterogeneity. he table shows averages, standard deviations, and percentage of minimum and 
maximum contributions (respectively 0 and 20). In each row, two situations are compared where the peer 
contributions were equal on average, but difered in heterogeneity (see Fig. 1).
Figure 2. Response to heterogeneity in peer contributions. he bar shows a breakdown of subjects in how 
they responded to increased heterogeneity in peer contributions. We considered the three cases where the 
average of peer contributions was the same, but heterogeneity in peer contributions was diferent (grouped 
bars in Fig. 1). Subjects that contributed less when there was more heterogeneity in peer contributions 
in at least one of those cases, and never contributed more, were categorised as ‘negative’ responders to 
heterogeneity. Whether they contributed less in response to increasing heterogeneity in one, two, or all three 
cases is indicated with increasingly darker shading. ‘Positive’ responders to heterogeneity were classiied 
similarly. If individuals contributed exactly the same for high and low heterogeneity in all three cases, they 
were classiied as ‘neutral’ responders to heterogeneity. If individuals contributed less in some of the cases 
and more in others, they were classiied as ‘inconsistent’.
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(see Table 1), more subjects were classiied as negative (39.9%) than positive (25.2%), but the fraction of 
positive individuals is substantial. Smaller fractions of individuals were neutral (14.7%) or inconsistent 
(20.2%) in their response to heterogeneity.
Figure 3 shows that there is a clear relation between the response to heterogeneity as measured in the 
second part of the experiment, and the general tendency to cooperate as determined in the irst part. 
Speciically, average contributions in the irst part were 72% higher for individuals that responded pos-
itively to heterogeneity when compared to individuals that responded negatively; individuals that had a 
neutral or inconsistent response to heterogeneity were in between. his association cannot be explained 
by ‘spill-over’ efects18 between the two parts of the experiment; it is still observed when controlling 
for peer cooperation in the irst part of the experiment (see Supplementary Information, section 3). 
Moreover, we still observe this clear diference when only considering the irst interaction round of the 
irst part, or the ‘unconditional contribution’ of the second part (see Methods) to determine general 
cooperation tendency. In these cases, contributions of individuals that positively responded to heteroge-
neity were respectively 50% and 40% higher than those of individuals that responded negatively; those 
diferences were highly signiicant in both cases (See Supplementary Information, section 2 for graphic 
representations and details).
Discussion
he results of our experiment can be summarised in three points. First, we conirm earlier observations 
that when the contributions of fellow group members to a public good are more heterogeneous, people 
on average respond by contributing less. However, this is not the whole story; more heterogeneity in peer 
contributions also leads to more variable (and more extreme) contributions in response (‘variation begets 
variation’). Second, we observe substantial individual diferences in how people respond to the degree 
of heterogeneity in peer cooperation. Some individuals consistently contribute more when there is more 
heterogeneity, whereas others consistently contribute less. Smaller fractions were either neutral or incon-
sistent in their response to increased heterogeneity in peer cooperation. hird, we ind a clear relation 
between general cooperation tendency and conditional responses to heterogeneity in peer contributions. 
Individuals that respond positively to heterogeneity in peer contributions tend to be more cooperative 
in a public goods game than individuals that respond negatively. Individuals that respond neutrally or 
inconsistently are intermediate in their cooperation tendency.
At irst sight, it may seem that the classiication of the individual variation that we made in our 
experiment (between positive, neutral, negative, and inconsistent individuals) does not relect very clear 
diferences between individuals. For example, an individual that was classiied as ‘positive’ may in fact 
only have responded positively to heterogeneity in one of three comparisons, and neutrally in both 
others. Sure enough, our experiment should be considered as a irst step in charting the individual 
Figure 3. Response to heterogeneity in peer contributions is associated with cooperation tendency. 
Bars show the average and SEM of contributions over ten rounds of a public goods game, where group 
composition was randomised before every round, for negative, neutral, positive, and inconsistent responders 
to heterogeneity. Statistically signiicant diferences between types are indicated (Tukey Honest Signiicant 
Diferences), except for diferences between inconsistent responders and any of the other groups. Numbers at 
the bottom of each bar indicate the number of subjects falling in this category.
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diferences in how people respond to heterogeneity in the cooperative behaviour of their peers; further 
studies will be needed to come to a more comprehensive account. Having said this, we observed that 
even individuals that responded marginally positively (the lightest blue shade in Fig. 2) to heterogeneity 
have a signiicantly higher cooperation tendency than individuals that responded marginally negatively 
(the lightest red shade in Fig. 2; see Supplementary Information, section 1 for details). he fact that even 
small diferences in response to heterogeneity are associated with large diferences in general cooperation 
tendency suggests that these diferences cannot simply be regarded as random noise. In this study, we 
found an association between self-assessed competitiveness and response to variation; this link could be 
more thoroughly investigated (for instance, by measuring competitiveness experimentally rather than 
through self-assessment). Associations with other factors, such as aspects of personality, may also be 
interesting to explore.
Individual variation is currently attracting much attention in all the behavioural sciences, including 
biology25,35–37 (including cultural evolution research21,38,39), psychology and neuroscience40–42, and eco-
nomics18,31,43. Biologists have shown that consistent individual diferences in behavioural tendencies oten 
have an adaptive explanation, and are likely to emerge in the course of evolution under a broad range of 
circumstances37,44. Moreover, various theoretical models24,45,46 show that the presence of consistent indi-
vidual variation in social behaviour will induce the evolution of sensitivity and responsiveness to this var-
iation. In line with the results reported here, these models predict that individuals difer consistently not 
only in their behaviour, but also in their response to the behaviour of others, and that both are correlated.
Our empirical results demonstrate that individuals vary not only in the degree of responsiveness, but 
also in the type of response to the social environment (i.e., there are positive and negative responders). 
his suggests that there exists a previously unrecognised dimension to social responsiveness. he observed 
link between the type of response and cooperation tendency can have important implications for the per-
formance of cooperation strategies. For example, if cooperators typically assort together47–49, a positive 
response to heterogeneity may help in maintaining cooperation by ‘forgiving’ occasional non-cooperation 
by a member of the group due to mistakes or temporary inability27–30,50–52. he types of responsiveness 
we observe might be related to personality characteristics, such as diferences in ‘lifestyle’. heory pre-
dicts that evolution will oten result in ‘pace of life’ syndromes, with individuals with a ‘fast’ and a ‘slow’ 
lifestyle coexisting in a population44,53. ‘Fast’ individuals are focused on short-term beneits, while ‘slow’ 
individuals are willing to take short-term losses if this is likely to result in longer-term beneits. One 
might speculate that cooperativeness and a positive response to variation are both facets of a slow life-
style; ‘slow’ individuals are more cooperative, since they hope to elicit long-term cooperation, and they 
respond more positively to variation, since they interpret heterogeneity as an opportunity for longer-term 
cooperation rather than as a threat. Similar arguments may be used to interpret non-cooperativeness in 
a social dilemma and a negative response to variation as facets of a fast lifestyle. Formal evolutionary 
models have to be developed to check if these verbal arguments can be substantiated. Quite obviously, 
the implications of individual diferences in type of responsiveness for the dynamics of social interactions 
and performance of cooperation strategies merit further empirical and theoretical scrutiny.
Methods
A total of 240 subjects (71% female, mostly students) participated in experimental sessions consisting 
of 16 subjects each, at the University of Groningen (the Netherlands). Participation was by informed 
consent, and the experimental setup was approved by the Sociological Laboratory of the University of 
Groningen. he experimental sessions were carried out in accordance with the approved guidelines. 
During the sessions (lasting approximately one hour), subjects made a number of simultaneous and 
anonymous decisions on computers. Subjects earned points (50 points = €1) with the decisions they 
made, and were paid accordingly in cash at the end of the session (mean payof: €14.87± 1.90; rang-
ing from €10.60 to €19.30; subjects were unaware of the earnings of others). Subjects received writ-
ten instructions, which were also read out loud by the experimenters at the start of each session (see 
Supplementary Information, section 5 for instructions). Each session consisted of two parts that were 
separately explained on the computer screen before they started, ater which subjects illed out a short 
quiz to check their comprehension. his experiment was conducted in conjunction with another exper-
iment; see Supplementary Information, section 4 for details. he experiment was run with the experi-
mental sotware z-Tree54 (code available upon request).
In the irst part of the experiment, individuals played ten rounds of a PGG, in groups of four. 
Individuals were grouped randomly at the start of every round, and were made explicitly aware of this 
in the instructions before this part, as well as at the start of every new round. At the beginning of each 
round, subjects were allocated 20 points to distribute between a group project and their personal account. 
Ater all subjects had made their decision, the total contributions to the group project were doubled and 
divided equally among the group members (irrespective of their contributions), and subjects were shown 
their earnings (as well as the contributions and earnings of their fellow group members).
In the second part of the experiment, subjects were asked how much they would contribute (0–20 
points) depending on the contributions of their fellow group members. We confronted them with ten 
hypothetical scenarios (on a single screen, in ixed order), where the contributions of their fellow group 
members were always 0, 10 or 20 points (see Fig. 1). Out of these ten scenarios, we pay particular atten-
tion to those pairs of cases that have the same average peer contribution, but difer in heterogeneity in 
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peer contributions. Comparing subjects’ conditional contributions within these paired cases allowed us 
to determine how individuals respond to heterogeneity in peer contributions. In addition to the ten 
conditional contributions, each subject also entered one ‘unconditional contribution’ (where the choice 
was limited to 0, 10 or 20 points). his unconditional contribution was simply the contribution that 
individuals would make to the group project in case they did not know the contributions of their fellow 
group members. Ater this, one round of a PGG was played in randomly formed groups of four. From 
each group, three randomly chosen subjects automatically made their unconditional contribution, and 
the remaining subject made their corresponding conditional contribution. A total of 22 subjects (8.8%) 
contributed the same amount regardless of the peer contributions; all except one of these individu-
als were unconditional free-riders, contributing 0 for every scenario (the remaining individual was an 
unconditional cooperator, always contributing 20). Under our classiication, these individuals would have 
been labelled as neutral responders to variation, but they are in fact completely unresponsive to peer 
contributions altogether. herefore, these individuals were excluded from the analysis. heir exclusion 
did not afect the main results presented in this paper (see Supplementary Information, section 3).
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